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THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND INTIMIDATION SUITS:
A NEW APPROACH
Joseph J. Brecher*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, a growing menace to public interest liti-
gation has emerged. There has been a spate of suits filed against
citizens who advocate public interest positions before courts and leg-
islative bodies. In these suits, the relief prayed for is of secondary
importance; the goal is to retaliate against public interest spokesman
and to discourage them from further activism.
Even though they never result in judgments for plaintiffs, the
filing and prosecution of intimidation suits has a severe chilling effect
on the defendants. If the current trend continues, there may be a
serious diminution in the critical watchdog role played by citizens
and citizens' groups in ensuring that the standards and requirements
of public interest statutes and regulations are carried out.
This article points out that even though the law favors public
interest activism and makes it almost impossible for intimidation
plaintiffs to prevail because of the numerous defenses available to
public interest litigants, those suits still achieve their intended effect
of punishing and silencing their opponents. The reasons why this
anomalous situation exists are explored and two changes in the law
which will alleviate the problem are suggested. Much of the discus-
sion centers around environmental cases, since the majority of intimi-
dation suits are in this area.' The analysis, however, is equally valid
for other types of public interest cases as well.
II. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
Over the past three decades, an enormous explosion of public
interest litigation has occurred. The California Supreme Court ex-
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1. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Asia Inv. Co. v.
Borowski, 133 Cal. App. 3d 832, 184 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1982), both of which are discussed in
this article.
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plained why in Serrano v. Priest:2
In the complex society in which we live it frequently occurs that
citizens in great numbers and across a broad spectrum have in-
terests in common. These, while of enormous significance to the
society as a whole, do not involve the fortunes of a single indi-
vidual to the extent necessary to encourage their private vindica-
tion in the courts. Although there are within the executive
branch of the government offices and institutions (exemplified
by the Attorney General) whose function it is to represent the
general public in such matters and to ensure proper enforce-
ment, for various reasons the burden of enforcement is not al-
ways adequately carried by those offices and institutions, ren-
dering some sort of private action imperative.8
Recognizing this situation, judges and legislators have fashioned
a number of techniques designed to aid the process of private en-
forcement of public rights. First, the courts have greatly relaxed the
traditional requirements of standing to sue for public interest liti-
gants. Second, the courts allow injunctions in public interest cases
even without a showing of irreparable injury, as is usually required.
Furthermore, judges freely grant intervention to public interest
groups. Finally, numerous statutes provide for and encourage partic-
ipation in administrative decision-making.
A. Standing Requirements Relaxed for Public Interest Litigants
The courts have greatly liberalized the standing requirements
for public interest plaintiffs.4 In order to satisfy the standing doc-
trine, plaintiffs must prove that they have suffered "injury in fact" to
an interest "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated" by the applicable statute or regulation.5 The traditional
method of showing injury in fact is to allege economic harm. The
Supreme Court, however, states that aesthetic and environmental in-
terests may also confer standing to sue.6 Organizations with injured
members may seek judicial review on their behalf. Furthermore, the
2. 20 Cal. 3d 25, 44, 569 P.2d 1303, 1313, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 325 (1977).
3. Id.
4. The doctrine of standing to sue limits judicial jurisdiction to cases "in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 101 (1942). The plaintiff must allege that he has a "personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
5. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972).
6. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure, 412 U.S. 669,
689 n.14 (1973).
7. Id. at 739; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963).
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quantum of harm which supports a plaintiff's right to sue need be
no more than an "identifiable trifle;" 8 for example, citizens may sue
under the Clean Water Act for almost any violation.9 In addition,
when important rights, such as the constitutional protection of free-
dom of association are involved, a public interest plaintiff has stand-
ing to assert the rights of third persons who are not litigants.10
Congress has recognized that the bureaucracy is often unwilling
or unable to protect the public's interests. As a result, dozens of stat-
utes designed to protect the public now authorize citizens suits.
Under these provisions, citizens may sue to enforce the public poli-
cies contained in the statute, without demonstrating any particular-
ized harm. Section 304 of the Clean Air Act" is the prototype of the
citizen suit provisions. The Senate Report describes the motivation
behind this section: "Government initiative in seeking enforcement
under the Clean Air Act has been restrained. Authorizing citizens to
bring suits for violations of standards should motivate governmental
agencies charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and
abatement proceedings."' 2
An often-quoted opinion interprets this language as a mandate
to the courts that: "[C]itizen groups are not to be treated as nui-
sances or troublemakers but rather as welcomed participants in the
vindication of environmental interests . . . Possible jurisdictional
barriers to citizens actions, such as amount in controversy and stand-
ing requirements, are expressly discarded by the Act."'"
Another requirement for standing - that the plaintiff's injuries
8. Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 615 F.
Supp. 1419, 1424 (D.N.J. 1985). In this case, the plaintiffs asserted that defendants' effluent
was contributing to the pollution of the Delaware River, which they used for recreation. The
defendant alleged that its contribution to the pollution of so large a river was "so small that
plaintiffs are not injured thereby." Id. at 424. The court ruled that the size of an injury is
irrelevant on the issue of standing since any violation of an anti-pollution requirement confers
standing on those affected by it.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); NAACP v. State, 357 U.S.
449, 458-59 (1958); Church of Hakeem, Inc. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 384, 388,
168 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (1980).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982).
12. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1970).
13. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 902 (1977). Indeed, the goal of citizen participation extends not only to litigation, but
into the sphere of negotiations between a polluter and a regulatory agency. If the agency denies
such participation, a public interest group is entitled to immediate access to the courts. See
Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Fritzche, Dodge & Olcott, 579 F.
Supp. 1528, 1534-35 (D.N.J. 1984).
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will be redressed by a favorable decision14 - is also relaxed in the
typical public interest case. For example, in Student Public Interest
Research Group of New Jersey v. A.T.& T. Bell Laboratories,5 the
court held that the plaintiffs possessed standing to sue for a past
violation of Clean Water Act standards, even though the defendant
was no longer discharging pollutants. The court acknowledged that
exacting civil penalties against the defendant would not compensate
the plaintiff or the public at large for injuries already suffered, but
would provide redress in the sense that a recovery would serve as a
general deterrent to future violators of the statute.1 '
B. Minimal Showing to Obtain Injunction
Public interest plaintiffs also benefit from a relaxation of the
elements needed for an injunction. Normally, injunctions are not
granted unless the plaintiff demonstrates irreparable injury. In
public interest litigation, however, the courts tend to waive this re-
quirement. For example, the Ninth Circuit ruled that irreparable
damages are presumed and an injunction should ordinarily be issued
when the defendant has violated the National Environmental Policy
Act 8 and the Endangered Species Act. 9
14. A plaintiff may not rely on the remote possibility that if the court grants relief
against the defendant, it would result in plaintiff's achieving his other objective. For example,
in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, the Court denied standing to
indigents who challenged a federal ruling granting non-profit status to hospitals which refused
to serve the indigents. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). The plaintiffs claimed that this action would "dis-
courage" those hospitals from providing them with free care. Id. at 42. The Court deemed this
supposition to be too "speculative" to confer standing on the plaintiffs. Id.
15. 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1200-01 (D.N.J. 1985).
16. But see Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th
Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded sub nom., Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987); Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392
(5th Cir. 1985). The First Circuit espouses yet another view, disallowing suits for past viola-
tions unless the plaintiff "fairly alleges a continuing likelihood that the defendant, if not en-
joined, will again . . . violate the Act." Pawtuxent Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1986), petition for cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 484 (1987). The
Supreme Court recently adopted the Fifth Circuit view, holding that citizens may sue only for
past violations. See Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
17. See, e.g., Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559
F.2d 841, 842-43 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 6 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, PROVISIONAL REM-
EDIES 254 (3d ed. 1985).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (1982). See Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240,
1250 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425,
1439 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982); see Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th
Cir. 1985).
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C. Liberalized Requirements for Public Interest Intervention
The courts usually employ a liberal test in deciding whether to
allow a public interest litigant to intervene.2 For example, a citizens
group was granted intervention where its only interest was the stare
decisis effect of a judgment in a case of first impression.2" Similarly,
a public interest group has the right to intervene in an action which
challenges the legality of a measure it previously supported.2
Judges are quite aware that government authorities often favor
development, rather than protection of resources for the benefit of
the public. For instance, in Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt23 the
plaintiffs, a coalition of conservative developers and ranchers, chal-
lenged the creation of a national conservation area in Idaho by for-
mer Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus, who was replaced in
1980 by James Watt. Because of Mr. Watt's anti-environmental pol-
icies, environmentalists believed that he would not enthusiastically
defend Mr. Andrus' action, so they sought intervention. The court,
in granting their motion, stated:
[T]he intervenor offers a perspective which differs materially
from that of the present parties to this litigation. Secretary An-
drus is no longer Secretary of the Interior. His successor, Secre-
tary Watt, was previously head of the Mountain States Legal
Foundation, the organization which is representing the plaintiff
Sagebrush Rebellion in this action. These facts support inter-
vention and also give rise to appellate's sobriquet for the case as
Watt v. Watt.24
D. Other Policies Favoring Public Participation
In addition to the policies discussed above, many statutes, regu-
lations and cases emphasize the need for agencies to solicit and re-
20. Intervention is often quite important to public interest groups. Typically, this proce-
dure is invoked where an industrial plaintiff sues the government to relax environmental
controls.
21. See State v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
22. Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. Spellman, 684
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom., Don't Waste Washington Legal Defense
Found. v. Washington, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1980).
A citizens group was granted intervention in a situation where the court concluded that the
government might not fully represent the public interest, even after the original parties en-
gaged in extensive settlement negotiations and a consent decree was actually filed with the
court. See United States v. Republic Steel, 15 Env't Rep. 1462 (N.D. II. 1980).
23. 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983).
24. Id. at 528.
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spond to public comments25 before taking action. This process forces
agencies to reconsider ill-advised projects and require additional en-
vironmental controls. Also, agencies' natural reluctance to undertake
this process provides public interest litigants with another way of
strengthening their litigation techniques. Legislative bodies echo this
sentiment in numerous statutes which institutionalize the right of the
public to obtain information from the bureaucracy and to have input
in the decision-making process. 6 Certain agencies are required to
provide special assistance to aid the public in dealing with them.27
Finally, there are numerous statutory provisions for successful
public interest litigants to recover attorneys fees. This area is dis-
cussed in detail below. 8
III. BUILT-IN IMPEDIMENTS TO PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
Despite numerous attempts to aid public interest litigants, they
still face many obstacles. Those who appropriate public resources for
their own use have access to enormous wealth and political power.
They hire the best lobbyists, publicists, and attorneys, and these costs
are passed along to the general public in the form of price increases
and tax deductions. Because corporations exist in perpetuity and
their employees are paid substantial salaries, large industries are
prepared to persevere in their battles over the long term. Public in-
terest activists, on the other hand, are invariably professionally ex-
hausted after a number of years fighting for their ideals.
This economic imbalance provides numerous advantages for re-
source-users. They are able to fund studies to support their view-
point and pay experts to testify on their behalf. Dozens of lawyers
and paralegals track the agency's activities and alert their clients to
any administrative proposals which affect them. They then seek the
25. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394, 402 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied sub nom., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Administrator EPA, 417 U.S. 921
(1974); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977);
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15087 (1986). For an example of a response, see People v. Kern
County, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 841, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67, 74 (1974).
26. See, e.g., The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.§ 552; the right to petition
contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e); the notice and response
provisions applicable to rule making in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) and (c); and the judicial review
provisions, 5 U.S.C. § 701-706. On the state level, California has analogous protections in the
Public Records Act. CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 6250-6265 (West 1968) and also in the Ralph M.
Brown Open Meetings Act. CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 54950-54961.
27. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 25217.1, 25222 (West 1986) (requiring the
appointment of a public advisor to the California Energy Resources Conservation and Devel-
opment Commissions and enumerating his duties).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 151-67.
[Vol. 28
INTIMIDATION SUITS
best advice and prepare testimony as needed. Public relations consul-
tants utilizing the latest graphics and brochures and release the re-
source users' story to the media and the public at large.
The nature of the political and judicial process, too, works
against the public interest sector. The foremost obstacle is inertia.
Unless a public interest group convinces a court, an agency, or the
Legislature that an abuse must be curbed, it will continue indefi-
nitely. The persuasion process is difficult; it entails establishing a
preponderance of the evidence before a judge, pushing a bill through
the Legislature, or setting the ponderous bureaucratic wheels in
motion.
The litigation process, as well, presents substantial impediments
to public interest plaintiffs. First, they are required to exhaust their
administrative remedies.29 Not only must they participate in the pre-
liminary administrative proceedings, they must also make all the ar-
guments they intend to raise in that forum. 0 In most cases, the re-
viewing court is precluded from hearing any additional evidence;
review is strictly confined to the administrative record.81
The record presents another formidable barrier. It often encom-
passes thousands of pages: preparing it constitutes an expensive and
time-consuming task. Furthermore, it is sometimes difficult to ascer-
tain precisely what information the record contains.3" Another prob-
29. Abelleira v. Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 293-94, 109 P.2d 942, 949-50 (1941).
30. Public interest participants must do more than merely state their point of view
before the agency in general terms; they must "structure their participation so that it is mean-
ingful, so that it alerts the agency to the intervenors' position and contentions." Vermont Yan-
kee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978);
see also Portland Cement Ass'n v. Rucklehaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied sub. nom., Portland Cement Corp. v. Administrator EPA, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
31. Association of Data Processing v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Ford Dealers Ass'n v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal. 3d 347, 365, 650 P.2d
328, 338, 185 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463 (1982); Bank of Am. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 42
Cal. App. 3d 198, 207, 116 Cal. Rptr. 770, 775 (1974); Browning-Ferris Indus. of California,
Inc. v. City Council of City of San Jose, 181 Cal. App. 3d 852, 861, 226 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580(1986). It should be noted, however, that this rule applies only to administrative mandamus
cases. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987). In a traditional manda-
mus case (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1085), in which the agency has not held a quasi-judicial
hearing, additional evidence may be presented to the trial court. See, e.g., No Oil, Inc. v. City
of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 79 n.6, 529 P.2d 66, 73 n.6, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34, 41 n.6 (1974);
Merz v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, 147 Cal. App. 3d 933, 937, 195 Cal. Rptr. 370,
372 (1983); Lassen v. City of Alameda, 150 Cal. App. 2d 44, 48, 309 P.2d 520, 522 (1957).
Furthermore, this rule does not apply to cases under the National Environmental Policy Act in
which the plaintiff claims that an agency unlawfully failed to prepare an Environmental Im-
pact Statement (EIS) or that an EIS was legally inadequate. See Suffolk County v. Secretary
of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1384-85 (2d Cir. 1977).
32. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 352-56 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also
1988]
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lem is that an accurate record of the agency's proceedings may not be
available to the public interest plaintiff. Administrative officials can-
not be questioned concerning their deliberations and the motives be-
hind agency actions." "
After the administrative or legislative process is complete, public
interest litigants are required to follow statutory notice procedures as
a prerequisite to filing a suit.34 Also, special, short statutes of limita-
tions apply.35
Once public interest litigation is filed, other restrictions must be
surmounted. The most daunting is the presumption that legislative
or administrative action is lawful.3 6 A court will defer to an agency's
interpretation of a statute, if reasonable, even if the court itself
would prefer an alternative explanation. 87 Similarly, a court may not
substitute its judgment for that of an agency in weighing economic,
environmental, and other policy factors. 8 Agency action is upheld if
any credible evidence in the record supports it: even though the court
finds that evidence offered by the public interest litigant is more
persuasive. 9
Hothem v. City & County of San Francisco Dep't of Pub. Works, 186 Cal. App. 3d 702, 231
Cal. Rptr. 70 (1986) (the court held that a mandamus proceeding, where the petitioner had
omitted certain items from the record, should be dismissed if the trial court on remand deter-
mined that the full record was reasonably available to him). To the same effect, see Sherwood
v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 183, 186, 593 P.2d 862, 864, 154 Cal. Rptr. 917, 919 (1979).
33. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); City of Fairfield v. Supe-
rior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768, 779, 537 P.2d 375, 379, 122 Cal. Rptr. 543, 549 (1975). However,
if the agency has not made formal findings and the plaintiffs are contending that the process
leading up to the decision was unlawful, then agency personnel are subject to discovery. San
Diego County v. Superior Court (Tri-City Hosp., Dist.), 176 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 1024-25,
222 Cal. Rptr. 484, 492-93 (1986).
34. See, e.g., Ralph M. Brown Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54953 (West 1983); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(d)(e) (1955).
35. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21167 (West 1972) (California Environmental
Quality Act); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(i) (1955). In addition, other statutes require
the petitioner to request the agency to prepare the record shortly after the case is filed. See e.g.,
CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21167.6(a) (West 1972). They also require the petitioner to seek a
hearing within ninety days. See e.g., CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21167.4 (West 1972); CAL.
GOVT. CODE § 6754 (West 1982).
36. See, e.g., Credit Ins. Gen. Agents Ass'n of California v. Payne, 16 Cal. 3d 651, 657,
547 P.2d 993, 997, 128 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884 (1976); Agricultural Labor Rel. Bd. v. Superior
Court, 16 Cal. 3d 392, 411, 546 P.2d 687, 700, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183, 195 (1976).
37. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.1l (1984); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978).
38. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 555.
39. See, e.g., Webb v. Gorsuch, 699 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 1983); Browning-Ferris
Indus., 181 Cal. App. 3d at 863, 866, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 581, 583 (agency may rely on staffis
opinion, despite contrary expert testimony in the record); Keithley v. Civil Serv. Bd., 11 Cal.
App. 3d 443, 449, 89 Cal. Rptr. 809, 813 (1970) (agency's action must be upheld if it is
supported by "any evidence, contradicted or otherwise"); Pitts v. Perluss, 58 Cal. 2d 824, 833,
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Even if there is no dispute that an agency has violated the law,
it may be difficult to obtain effective relief. For example, the courts
occasionally allow the Environmental Protection Agency to ignore
statutory deadlines because it is understaffed and needs to concen-
trate on more important projects. 0 After a court orders an agency to
take specific action, bureaucrats often continue to delay taking the
appropriate measures, thus necessitating additional trips to the
courthouse."1
IV. THE GENESIS OF INTIMIDATION SUITS
Despite these built-in advantages, pro-development forces have
added a new weapon to their arsenal in the past few years. They
have begun to file counter-suits against public interest litigants for
the purpose of punishing them for past challenges to their activities
and to dissuade them from future opposition."' These intimidation
suits take the form of actions for malicious prosecution, abuse of pro-
cess, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage,
libel, slander, conspiracy, or other intentional torts. Usually, the de-
veloper asks for huge damages for losses allegedly suffered due to
delays or litigation expenses incurred during the previous public in-
terest litigation.
To the author's knowledge, no intimidation suit has ever re-
sulted in a judgment for the plaintiff."3 Nonetheless, these suits
377 P.2d 83, 85, 27 Cal. Rptr. 19, 24 (1962) (citing Brock v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App.
2d 594, 605, 241 P.2d 283, 290 (1952)) (administrative determination must be sustained un-
less it is "entirely lacking in evidentiary support").
40. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 358-60 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 712-13 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also
National Congress of Hispanic Am. Citizens v. Usery, 554 F.2d 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
41. One particularly grievous example is the long-standing effort by the Sierra Club to
force the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate air pollution from coal strip
mines. The Club first petitioned the agency to adopt such regulations in 1979. EPA sat on that
request, studying it year after year. Finally, the Club sought judicial assistance and the court
of appeals ordered the agency to take action within ninety days. See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch,
715 F.2d 653, 661 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1983). After EPA ignored this direction, the Club returned
to court and obtained an order directing it to issue a proposed rule by October 1984. EPA
grudgingly complied, but then refused to take final action. The Sierra Club thus was forced to
bring another suit, resulting in a decision that the court had jurisdiction to oversee the process.
However, the court of appeals then ruled that EPA had not yet engaged in unreasonable
action by delaying final action for three years. Sierra Club v. EPA, 26 Env't Rep. 1465 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 48, 51, 60.
43. The University of Denver's intimidation lawsuit project has reached the same con-
clusion. See Pring, Intimidation Suits Against Citizens: A Risk for Public-Policy Advocates,
Nat'l L.J., July 22, 1985, at 16.
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achieve their objective of silencing citizens opposed to commercial in-
terests. 4 Public interest defendants may be unwilling or unable to
vindicate their rights in court for a number of reasons.
First is the risk of financial catastrophe, should they lose. While
the probability of an adverse judgment is small, the average public-
spirited citizen is unwilling to jeopardize his financial future for the
abstract satisfaction of vindicating his principles.
Furthermore, even if the defendant is absolutely convinced he
will prevail, the price of victory in time, money, and aggravation is
very high. He must submit to the litigation process against his will.
Typically, he will experience a very unpleasant deposition session, as
well as the inconvenience of delays and uncertainty which invariably
accompany litigation."
The defendant must hire an experienced attorney. Because this
type of case is often sui generis, the attorney must devote many
hours to learning the peculiar facts of the case, and taking part in
discovery. Then, he or she must prepare and argue a lengthy memo-
randum on a demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings, sum-
mary judgment, or other summary proceeding."' Thus, the poten-
tially huge exposure and unpleasantness of litigation is enough to
scare away all but the most resolute defendant in an intimidation
suit.'
V. PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIVES IN BRINGING INTIMIDATION SUITS;
THREE CASES
What prompts commercial interests to bring intimidation suits?
An examination of three cases handled recently by the author sug-
gests possible objectives.
44. The author has had several personal conversations with intimidation suit defendants
who expressed an unwillingness to participate in any further public interest activities.
45. Typically, plaintiffs in intimidation suits insist on lengthy discovery proceedings and
resist efforts to dispose of the case before trial by means of a motion for summary judgment.
46. Intimidation suits rarely reach the trial stage. However, the California Supreme
Court has indicated that, under certain circumstances, a plaintiff may be entitled to present
evidence concerning a public interest defendant's improper motivation in instituting the origi-
nal lawsuit. See Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc., 42
Cal. 3d 1157, 1168, 728 P.2d 1202, 1208-09, 232 Cal. Rptr. 567, 574 (1986).
47. It is true that a defendant with a homeowners' or other liability insurance is entitled
to free representation by his insurer and, to the extent that the allegations in the complaint
may give rise to a conflict of interest, the insurer is obligated to pay for independent counsel
chosen by the insured. See San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 162
Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984). However, it should be remembered that the
typical homeowners' policy excludes coverage for intentional torts.
[Vol. 28
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Sierra Club v. Superior Court"' was a malicious prosecution
case against the Sierra Club filed by Monte and Barbara Reed, own-
ers of a resort hotel in the town of Mendocino. The Sierra Club
previously brought a mandate proceeding in superior court against
the California Coastal Commission and the Reeds, challenging a
permit which allowed the Reeds to expand their hotel. In the previ-
ous action, the superior court agreed with the Sierra Club's conten-
tion that the Commission used the wrong legal test in granting the
permit and therefore remanded the matter to the Coastal Commis-
sion for reconsideration. The Commission then re-examined the mat-
ter, applied the proper standard, and again granted the permit. At
that point, the case was dismissed.4
The court of appeals swiftly disposed of the matter on summary
judgment, noting that an essential element of a cause of action for
malicious prosecution was lacking. The Club was partially successful
in the underlying lawsuit, since it established that the Commission
applied an improper legal standard in the first permit proceeding.
Thus, the court did not even reach the numerous constitutional, stat-
utory and common law defenses presented by the Sierra Club.5
Ross Landing Associates v. Kentfield Civic League51 was an
action by a developer for malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
interference with economic advantage, and conspiracy. The defend-
ants were the Kentfield Civic League (KCL), a non-profit corpora-
tion devoted to neighborhood improvement, Friends of Kentfield
(Friends), an ad hoc unincorporated association formed to challenge
Ross Landing's development plans, and Barbara Dolan, the orga-
nizer of Friends and a member of KCL.
Friends originally challenged a decision by Marin County to
permit Ross Landing to construct an office building in Kentfield
without preparing an Environmental Impact Report (EIR), pursu-
ant to the California Environmental Quality Act.52 That suit was
48. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1138, 214 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1985).
49. The Reeds were represented in their malicious prosecution action by Joseph
Gughemetti, an attorney, with a long history of advocating anti-environmentalist causes. In his
book The Taking Mr. Gughemetti criticized environmentalists who encouraged "abuse, excess,
and bureaucratic bungling." J. GUGHEMETIr & E. D. WHEELER, THE TAKING 44 (1982).
Gughemetti further stated that the Coastal Commission's, "actions ... for the good of the
coast actually harmed the environment." Id. at 187.
50. Sierra Club v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1138, 1144, 214 Cal. Rptr. 740,
744 (1985). Many of these defenses are discussed in the following sections.
51. Complaint for Damages, Ross Landing Assoc. v. Kentfield Civic League (No.
121358 Marin County Superior Court) (January 17, 1985) (on file at the Santa Clara Law
Review office).
52. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21151 (West 1986).
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successful; the superior court voided the approval of the office build-
ing project and ordered the county to prepare a focused EIR dealing
with a few specified issues.5"
The county issued an EIR on the office building project which
KCL deemed inadequate because it failed to discuss the cumulative
impacts of the project, as well as air and noise pollution. None of
these issues were specified in the judge's order concerning the fo-
cused EIR in the Friends suit. KCL also objected to the failure of
the EIR to consider the alternative of a smaller office facility. There-
fore, KCL sought a writ of mandate in superior court.54 The case
was assigned to the same superior court trial judge who decided the
Friends case. He ruled that KCL was barred by the doctrines of
collateral estoppel and laches from attacking the failure of the fo-
cused EIR to discuss any types of environmental impacts which were
specified in his orider in the Friends suit.55
However, the court did agree with KCL that the EIR was in-
adequate because it failed to discuss the alternative of a smaller office
building. Accordingly, the issue was remanded to the county. KCL
appealed the portion of the judge's ruling based on collateral estop-
pel and laches.56
Ultimately, Ross Landing abandoned the office construction
project and opted instead to build a mini-storage facility, which was
approved by the county in December, 1985. KCL then filed another
action challenging the new project on the grounds that it violated
applicable planning and zoning laws and that the county once again
was not in compliance with CEQA.5"
Meanwhile, Ross Landing filed its tort action against Friends,
some of its members, KCL and Barbara Dolan. The developer con-
53. Judgment Granting Peremptory Writ of Mandate, Dolan v. County of Matin (No.
111585 Main County Superior Court) (June 10, 1983) (on file at the Santa Clara Law
Review office)
.54. Amended Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, Kentfield Civic League v. County of
Marin (No. 116585 Marin County Superior Court) (March 8, 1984) (on file at the Santa
Clara Law Review office).
55. The court held that those doctrines applied, since KCL, as well as Friends was
"composed of, and represents taxpayers, property owners and residents of Kentfield ....
The court therefore concluded that KCI was bound by his earlier decision that a focused EIR
would suffice. Statement of Decision; Order Granting Limited Writ of Mandate at 1-2,
Kentfield Civic League v. County of Marin (No. 11585 Matin County Superior Court) (June
15, 1984) (on file at the Santa Clara Law Review office).
56. Kentfield Civic League v. County of Matin (Court of Appeal, First Appellate Dis-
trict, No. A028918).
57. Kentfield Civil League v. Ross Landing Associates, No. 126410 (Matin County
Superior Court, January 2, 1986).
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tended that KCL's decision to appeal the trial judge's ruling based
on laches and collateral estoppel constituted malicious prosecution
and abuse of process, even though that appeal was still pending.
Fearful of the remote possibility of suffering a large judgment,
and wishing to avoid the expense and annoyance of a lengthy trial,
KCL and its members agreed to drop their challenge to the mini-
storage facility in exchange for Ross Landing's dismissal of its tort
action. Thus, the developer was able to achieve its objective - con-
struction of the facility without legal impediment. Friends and Bar-
bara Dolan refused to participate in the settlement. Instead, they
sought and were granted summary judgment."8
Gensler v. Lambert59 demonstrated another possible motivation
for an intimidation suit. In this case, the plaintiffs owned two houses
on a single parcel in Berkeley. They applied to the City Council for
a lot split in order to sell the houses. At the hearing, the application
was opposed by various neighbors, who felt that the plaintiffs'
scheme would diminish the already scarce supply of rental housing
in the area.
The plaintiffs alleged that six of the neighbors entered into a
conspiracy to scare off potential buyers and committed various acts of
vandalism, purportedly for the purpose of dissuading the plaintiffs
from selling the houses as separate units. Ultimately, the houses
were sold at a price which approximated their estimated value.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs sought general and exemplary damages in the
amount of $1.75 million.
They were distinctly unsuccessful. In order to avoid the expense
of a trial, the two defendants represented by the author agreed to
settle the issue for the sum of $300.00. The case went to trial against
the remaining defendants. Two of them were granted a judgment at
the conclusion of plaintiffs' case, pursuant to Civil Procedure Code
section 631.8.60 After a five-day trial, the court ruled in favor of the
remaining two defendants, finding that there was no credible evi-
dence to support the conspiracy theory or to show that the defend-
ants were linked to the alleged acts of vandalism.6 Furthermore, the
58. Order for Entry of Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants Barbara Dolan and
Friends of Kentfield, Ross Landing Assoc. v. Kentfield Civic League (No. 121358 Main
County Superior Court) (June 30, 1986) (on file at the Santa Clara Law Review office).
59. Complaint for Damages, Gensler v. Lambert (No. 583850-7 Alameda County Supe-
rior Court) (April 9, 1984) (on file at the Santa Clara Law Review office).
60. CAL. CODE OF CIv. PROC. § 631.8 (West 1987).
61. Tenative Decision, Gensler v. Lambert (No. 583850-7 Alameda County Superior
Court) (February 23, 1987) (on file at the Santa Clara Law Review office).
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court concluded, plaintiffs did not suffer substantial damages, since
they received more than the market price for the houses.62
In each of these three cases, there was little doubt that the de-
fendants would ultimately prevail. However, they did so only after
the expenditure of an extraordinary amount of time and money.
And, while the suits were proceeding, the defendants' public interest
activities were sharply curtailed because their attention was diverted
to the litigation.
VI. DEFENSES TO AN INTIMIDATION SUIT
The main reason why plaintiffs in intimidation suits invariably
lose is that a wealth of defenses are available to the defendants. This
section discusses two generic constitutional and statutory defenses
which are interposed against many different types of intimidation
causes of action. Next, specific defenses to a number of torts which
are commonly asserted in intimidation suits are examined.
A. The Constitutional Right to Petition
Perhaps the most basic defense to intimidation suits is the con-
stitutional right to petition. 8 The nature of that first amendment
protection was thoroughly explicated in Sierra Club v. Butz." In
that case, the Sierra Club brought an injunction to stop logging on
national forest land which was eligible for wilderness status. The
logging company then filed a counter-action, asserting that the Sierra
Club "intentionally, willfully and wrongfully, by oral and written
representations, by asserting administrative appeals, by filing of the
complaint herein and other complaints, and by other acts" 5 inter-
fered with the logging company's contractual right to cut trees in the
area. The district court dismissed the logging company's claim be-
cause the Sierra Club was protected by the constitutional right to
petition the government for a redress of grievances.
Quoting Thomas v. Collins,6 the court stated:
[The right to petition] is a basic freedom in a participatory gov-
ernment, closely related to freedom of speech and press; together
62. Id. at 6.
63. The first amendment prohibits Congress from making any law "prohibiting ... the
right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
64. 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
65. Id. at 935-36.
66. 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
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these are the 'indispensable democratic freedoms' that cannot be
abridged if the government is to continue to reflect desires of the
people. Thus, this court cannot be too careful in assuring that
its acts do not infringe this right.6"
The court discussed a line of Supreme Court cases beginning
with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 8 which held that the rights of
free press and speech- constitute a defense to common law torts such
as defamation and invasion of privacy. Such civil actions must be
limited to the same extent that a state would be limited in imposing
criminal sanctions, because "fear of damage awards . . .may be
markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a crimi-
nal statute." 9 As long as the speech or writing "is a genuine attempt
to communicate with others concerning matters of 'public or general
interest,' " there can be no civil liability."
The court then articulated the "sham" standard for judging po-
tential infringements on the right to petition.. Analogizing to the
holding in Eastern Railroad Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight,7 the court ruled that the right to petition protected the de-
fendants, even if they were guilty of actual malice. Liability exists
only if their petition was a sham: they knew that the statements were
false or spoke with a reckless disregard as to whether they were true
or false. 2 Petitioning the government constitutes a sham only if the
primary motive is "not to obtain governmental action, but to other-
wise injure the plaintiff."'73
The California Supreme Court also recognizes the importance
of the right to petition. In City of Long Beach v. Bozek74 the court
indicated that the right to petition applied to judicial actions, as well
as petitions to the legislative or executive branches. The court went
further than the federal cases, by holding that the constitutional pro-
tection applied, even if the plaintiff demonstrates actual malice. This
term was defined as: "knowledge of the falsity of the allegations
67. Butz, 349 F. Supp. at 936.
68. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
69. Butz, 349 F. Supp. at 937.
70. d.
71. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
72. Id. at 138-41. The same rationale applies to court cases, as well as legislative lobby-
ing. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
73. Butz, 349 F. Supp. at 939. The "sham" standard has also been adopted by the
California Supreme Court in Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal. 3d 311, 321-22, 703 P.2d 58, 64, 216
Cal. Rptr. 718, 724 (1985). See Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hallowbow, 709 F.2d 643 (7th
Cir. 1983) (right to petition protected defendants in securities fraud suit, even if their petition-
ing activity adversely affected plaintiff's business).
74. 31 Cal. 3d 527, 533-34, 645 P.2d 137, 140, 183 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89-90 (1982).
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made in the complaint or with reckless disregard for their truth or
falsity." 5 Thus, the court concluded, the right to petition afforded
an absolute privilege. Anything less would result in "a severe chil-
ling effect . . . on the legitimate exercise of the right to express be-
liefs freely when those beliefs appear to be derogatory of the gov-
erning authorities."' 0
In Matossian v. Fahmie,7 an applicant for a liquor license
sued competitors who protested his application. He claimed they
were conspiring to prevent competition. The court of appeals ruled
that the trial court properly granted a demurrer and summary judg-
ment because the constitutional issued involved was a question of
law, not fact. It noted that neither the defendants' allegedly improper
motivation nor their lack of success in the previous proceeding de-
feated the constitutional protection they enjoyed."6
The United States Supreme Court, while acknowledging the
pre-eminent position of the right to petition, recently rejected the
California view concerning absolute immunity. In McDonald v.
Smith,79 the Court held that the right to petition afforded only a
qualified privilege against a libel action. If the defendant acted with
actual malice, defined as "knowledge at the time that the words are
false, or . . . without probable cause or without checking for truth
by the means at hand," the plaintiff could succeed.8" The Court con-
cluded that the petition clause did not merit any higher status than
the other first amendment freedoms - speech, publication, and as-
sembly - none of which afforded an absolute privilege."1
Thus, it appears that defendants in intimidation suits in federal
75. Id. at 534, 645 P.2d at 140, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
76. Id. at 535, 645 P.2d at 141, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 90. Recognition of this chilling effect
prompted a court of appeals to refuse to grant the plaintiff the opportunity to file a third
amended complaint for slander, when earlier efforts to state a cause of action had been tossed
out by the court. The court in Maple Properties v. Harris, noted:
While we might be disposed to grant an additional leave to amend in a usual
tort case, we are mindful that the present case seeks to inhibit fundamental First
Amendment rights. Where such precious rights are involved, 'speedy resolution
of cases . . . is desirable' to avoid a chilling effect upon the exercise of free
speech.
158 Cal. App. 3d 997, 1013, 205 Cal. Rptr. 532, 543 (1984).
77. 101 Cal. App. 3d 128, 161 Cal. Rptr. 532 (1980).
78. Id. at 136-37, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 535-37. See also Smith v. Silvey, in which the court
held that the right to petition protected a protestor, no matter how "exasperating" his behavior
is to his adversary. 149 Cal. App. 3d 400, 406, 197 Cal. Rptr. 15, 19 (1983).
79. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
80. Id. at 485 (quoting Dellinger v. Belk, 34 N.C. App. 488, 490, 238 S.E.2d 788, 789
(1977)).
81. Id.
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courts find it much more difficult to obtain summary judgment than
in state courts. This is so because it is relatively simple for a plaintiff
to establish a putative factual controversy concerning the public in-
terest defendant's prior motivation. Such a conflict vitiates summary
judgment and pushes the case on toward trial.8
B. Civil Code Section 47(2)
California statutory law provides a protection analogous to the
constitutional right to petition. California Civil Code section 47(2)88
establishes a privilege for any publication or broadcast made during
a legislative or judicial proceeding or any other proceeding author-
ized by law.
In Pettitt v. Levy 84 the court summarized the "public policy
supporting the privilege. . . ..." The court quoted from a previous
opinion:
Underlying the recognition of this privilege is the impor-
tant public policy of affording the utmost freedom of access to
the courts. [Citations.] The privilege is accorded not only to par-
ties but to witnesses, even where their testimony is allegedly
perjured and malicious. [Citations.] 'The resulting lack of any
really effective civil remedy against perjurers is simply part of
the price that is paid for witnesses who are free from intimida-
tion by the possibility of civil liability for what they say.'
The privilege is an absolute one because it protects publi-
cations made with actual malice or with the intent to do harm. 6
Numerous cases recognize the importance of allowing members
of the public the absolute right to communicate with government
bodies. As the court noted in King v. Borges,8" the privilege extends
not only to official statements made before an agency, but to any
communication which "is designed to prompt action by that
agency .... "88 "There must be an open channel of communication
82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Greenebaum Mortgage Co. v. Town and Garden As-
socs., 385 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1967); Hill v. Linahan, 697 F.2d 1032 (11th Cir. 1983); CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 437(c) (West 1973 & Supp. 1987); Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper
Serv. Bureau, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 842, 851-52, 484 P.2d 953, 958-60, 94 Cal. Rptr. 785, 790-91
(1971).
83. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 47(2) (West 1982).
84. 28 Cal. App. 3d 484, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1972).
85. Id. at 488, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
86. Id. (quoting in part Kachig v. Boothe, 22 Cal. App. 3d 626, 641, 99 Cal. Rptr. 393,
403 (1971)).
87. 28 Cal. App. 3d 27, 104 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1972).
88. Id. at 34, 104 Cal. Rptr. 417.
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• . .which would quickly close if its use subjected the user to ...
libel."8
In addition to defamation, (with the exception of actions for
malicious prosecution)," section 47(2) applies to all other actions,
including intentional interference with contractual relations and
abuse of process.91
Any written or oral statement that is required or permitted by
law in the course of litigation is also protected by Civil Code section
47(2). The protection is not limited to oral or written evidence,
briefs, or affidavits. "If the publication has a reasonable relation to
the action and is permitted by law, the absolute privilege attaches."' 2
The courts are emphatic in stating that the privilege of Civil
Code section 47(2) is virtually absolute, even if malice is demon-
strated. 8 Even the most vicious types of utterance are protected, if
made in the context of litigation. For example, in Izzi v. Rellas4
one attorney accused another of extortion in connection with his de-
mands for agreeing to vacate a default judgment. The court, how-
ever, pointed out that settlements are favored by the law and are
protected by the privilege. The court repeated the well-established
rule that any doubt concerning the applicability of the protection of
section 47(2) is resolved in favor of the privilege.' 5
89. Id. A number of other cases have repeated the "open channel of communications
with government" language of the King case. See, e.g., Brody v. Montalbano, 87 Cal. App. 3d
725, 738, 151 Cal. Rptr. 206, 215 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 844 (1979); Bledsoe v. Wat-
son, 30 Cal. App. 3d 105, 110, 106 Cal. Rptr. 197, 200 (1973).
90. Pettitt v. Levy, 28 Cal. App. 3d 484, 489, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650, 653 (1972).
91. Woodcourt II, Ltd. v. McDonald Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 245, 249, 173 Cal. Rptr.
836, 838 (1981); Lebros v. State Bar, 165 Cal. App. 3d 656, 667, 211 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852
(1985). The statement, itself, need not be defamatory to be afforded protection under section
47(2). Portman v. George McDonald Law Corp., 99 Cal. App. 3d 988, 991, 160 Cal. Rptr.
505, 507 (1979).
92. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 381, 295 P.2d 405, 409 (1956).
93. Royer v. Steinberg, 90 Cal. App. 3d 490, 499, 153 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (1979); see
also Chen v. Fleming, 147 Cal. App. 3d 36, 39, 194 Cal. Rptr. 913, 914 (1983); Borowski,
133 Cal. App. 3d at 841-43, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 323-25; Williams v. Taylor, 129 Cal. App. 3d
745, 754, 181 Cal. Rptr. 423, 428 (1982); Ascherman v. Natanson, 23 Cal. App. 3d 861, 864-
65, 100 Cal. Rptr. 656, 658-59 (1972).
94. 104 Cal. App. 3d 254, 163 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1980).
95. Id. at 262-63, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 693-95. In addition, the publication need not even
be pertinent or relevant in a technical sense; it need only have some connection or a relation to
the proceedings. Id. at 264-65, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 693-95. See Brody, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 734,
151 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13; Costa v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d 673, 677, 204 Cal. Rptr.
1, 3 (1984). There was a similar holding in an environmental context in Borowski, 133 Cal.
App. 3d 832, 184 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1982). In that case, an attorney threatened to bring a
lawsuit under the California Environmental Quality Act in order to coerce a settlement in
another case. The court ruled that the privilege of Civil Code section 47(2) precluded the use
of that threat as a means of showing ulterior motivation in a later abuse of process action. In
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The policy in favor of the privilege is so strong that it is even
applied in situations where the defendants were guilty of moral tur-
pitude. For example, in Pettitt" the defendants were protected by
section 47(2), even though they submitted an admittedly forged
building permit application in a scheme to deprive the plaintiff of a
building variance to which he would otherwise have been entitled.
In short, the protections afforded by the constitutional right to
petition and the privilege of Civil Code section 47(2) immunize most
public interest activities, including testimony before political and ad-
ministrative bodies and litigation. Those provisions ordinarily pro-
vide generic defenses to most intimidation suits. In addition, numer-
ous defenses are available to the specific causes of action usually
relied upon by plaintiffs in intimidation suits.
VII. DEFENSES TO PARTICULAR ACTIONS
A. A Paradigm Case: Asia Investment Co. v. Borowski
The following sections, discuss a number of specific defenses
available against the five causes of action most favored by plaintiffs
in intimidation suits - malicious prosecution, abuse of process, in-
terference with economic advantage, defamation, and conspiracy. As
an introduction, a recent case which formed a paradigm for the clas-
sic intimidation suit - Borowski,97 is examined.
In this case, Borowski conducted some real estate business with
Wong, the General Partner of Asia Investment. They also litigated
ownership of a house located on a tract which Wong wished to de-
velop. Borowski filed a suit under the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA) to stop the development. During the CEQA
litigation, Borowski's counsel suggested that Wong should settle the
house case, because the loss of the CEQA action "would blow Asia's
whole subdivision."98 The trial court dismissed the CEQA action be-
cause of laches. Four days after that decision, Wong filed a com-
dictum, the supreme court has recently indicated that such coercive out-of-court statements
during settlement discussions may be used as evidence of ulterior motive for the purpose of
establishing a cause of action for abuse of process. Although a tort action can not be predicated
directly on such statements. See Oren, 42 Cal. 3d at 1168, 728 P.2d at 1211, 232 Cal. Rptr. at
576.
96. 28 Cal. App. 3d 485, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1972). Similarly, in Kachig, the court
held that the privilege applies even to perjured testimony. 22 Cal. App. 3d 626, 99 Cal. Rptr.
393 (1971). See O'Neil v. Cunningham, 118 Cal. App. 3d 466, 477, 173 Cal. Rptr. 422, 428
(1981).
97. 133 Cal. App. 3d 832, 842, 184 Cal. Rptr. 317, 324 (1982).
98. Id. at 842, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
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plaint for malicious prosecution, intentional interference with pro-
spective business advantage, and abuse of process.
The trial court granted Borowski's motion for summary judg-
ment on the cause of action for malicious prosecution. It stated the
rule that in order to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must
plead and prove that the prior judicial proceeding terminated in his
favor." The court noted that a favorable termination is one that in-
dicates "the innocence of the accused. . . ." If, on the other hand,
the dismissal is "on technical grounds, for procedural reasons, or for
any other reason not inconsistent with . . . guilt, it does not consti-
tute a favorable termination."'1 "
The court of appeals -noted that the dismissal of the CEQA case
on the basis of laches "did not reflect in any way on the merits of the
petition."10' It acknowledged that Asia Investment successfully
demonstrated to the trial court in the CEQA action all of the ele-
ments necessary to set up a defense of laches. Nevertheless, none of
those elements demonstrated whether or not the city had complied
with the requirements of CEQA."'0
But, Asia argued, the laches decision did reflect the equitable
merits of the underlying action. The court discounted this argument:
Even if this were so, such a reflection does not necessarily con-
trol the legal issues. For all that appears from the record, the
Borowskis may have been correct in their allegations of CEQA
violations, but as stated before, the trial court never reached
those issues. The dismissal of the petition was for a reason not
inconsistent with the 'guilt' of Asia or the city, and for that rea-
son did not constitute a 'favorable termination' for purposes of a
malicious prosecution action." 8
Next, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not
err in refusing to allow Asia to file an amended complaint alleging
intentional interference with prospective business advantage, because
no cause of action was or could be stated. The court found "Asia is
unable to assert any business relationship with which there had been
a tortious interference."'
1 0 4
99. Id. at 837, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 321 (quoting Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841,
845, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 180 (1971)).-
100. Id. at 837-38, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 321 (quoting Minasian v. Sapse, 80 Cal. App. 3d
823, 826, 145 Cal. Rptr. 829, 831 (1978)).
101. Id. at 838, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
102. Id. at 839, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 321-22.
103. Id. at 839, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
104. Id. at 840, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
[Vol. 28
INTIMIDATION SUITS
Finally, the court held that there was no cause of action for
abuse of process, either. One essential element of such a cause of
action is that the defendant must have an ulterior motive in using the
process and must have used it in a wrongful manner. Merely carry-
ing out the process to its authorized conclusion, even with malicious
intentions, is not actionable.'"
Asia Investment sought to supply such an ulterior motive by
pointing out that counsel for the Borowskis threatened off the record
to use the CEQA case to coerce a settlement in the house case. The
court's reply was succinct: "Perhaps so, but it was also a privileged
statement."' 0 6 The court continued: "The privilege attaches even
though the publication was made outside a courtroom, as many por-
tions of a 'judicial proceeding' occur outside of open court."' '
Furthermore, the court noted, the statement at issue, even
though it contained a threatening inference, bore a clear relation to
the house case and the CEQA action and, as such, it was a settle-
ment proposal.' 08 Thus, the court concluded:
Even considering the settlement proposal was made in a manner
which might be considered a veiled 'threat' we recognize this
type of language is part of the adversary system, and, as such, is
to be anticipated in the course of 'heated battle' between adverse
parties to proceedings considered to be within the context of 'ju-
dicial proceedings.'0 9
In the following sections, other defenses which are available to
some of the most common intimidation causes of action are discussed.
B. Malicious Prosecution
Courts frequently state that actions for malicious prosecution
105. Id. at 842, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. The court alluded to the point that "there is an element of coercion present in
every lawsuit." Borowski, 133 Cal. App. 3d at 843 n.7, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 324 n.7.
109. Id. at 843, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 325. As pointed out above, the California Supreme
Court has questioned the exclusion of settlement proposals as evidence of malice pursuant to
civil code section 47(2). Oren, 42 Cal. 3d at 1168, 728 P.2d at 1209, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
But the same opinion also furnishes an additional defense to a cause of action for abuse of
process. The court pointed out that "the mere filing or maintenance of a lawsuit - even for an
improper purpose - is not a proper basis for an abuse of process action." Id. at 1169, 728
P.2d at 1209, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 574 (The court intimated that such an allegation may give rise
to a cause of action for malicious prosecution). Id. at 1169-70, 728 P.2d at 1210, 232 Cal.
Rptr. at 575-76.
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are disfavored.110 A plaintiff in a malicious prosecution suit must
make three showings concerning the prior action:
1. It was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and
was pursued to a favorable termination;
2. It was brought without probable cause;
3. It was initiated with malice. 1 '
Each of these three elements is strictly construed against the
plaintiff. First, as noted above, the favorable termination require-
ment is satisfied only by a decision on the merits. Dismissal on tech-
nical grounds such as collateral estoppel or laches is insufficient.
Furthermore, if the defendant prevailed on even one of numerous
causes of action in the prior suit, a cause of action for malicious
prosecution will not lie. This is true even if the defendant ultimately
lost on that single issue upon remand. 12
Defendants in malicious prosecution actions have probable
cause to bring suit if they have consulted a lawyer in good faith,
have disclosed all of the facts to him or her, have been advised by the
lawyer that a valid cause of action exists, and have honestly acted
upon the advice of counsel."" Reliance on the advice of an attorney
incontrovertibly establishes probable cause, no matter how erroneous
that advice may be." 4
In Tool Research & Engineering Corp. v. Henigson, " for ex-
ample, plaintiffs argued that attorneys are required to weigh the evi-
dence for and against clients and to proceed with representation only
if they are convinced that the trier of fact would accept the evidence
in favor of the cause represented. The court rejected this contention,
stating that an attorney is not a guarantor to his client's adversary
that his client will prevail. An attorney need only have a reasonable
110. As the court of appeals noted:
[Tihe bare allegation of want of probable cause contained in the complaint is
not a sufficient allegation . . . Averments of conspiracy and of the knowledge of
the falsity of the charge and the sprinkling of the complaint with vituperative
epithets such as, 'wickedly, and with studied care and protracted deliberation'
are not allegations of fraud.
Holliday v. Holliday, 123 Cal. 26, 55 P. 703 (1898); see also Cowles v. Carter, 115 Cal. App.
3d 350, 355, 171 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271 (1981); Norton v. John M.C. Marble Co., 30 Cal. App.
2d 451, 455, 86 P.2d 892, 894 (1939).
111. Oren, 42 Cal. 3d at 1169, 728 P.2d at 1209, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
112. Sierra Club v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1138, 214 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1985).
113. Citizens State Bank v. Hoffman, 44 Cal. App. 2d 854, 857, 113 P.2d 221, 222
(1941).
114. Kassan v. Bledsoe, 252 Cal. App. 2d 810, 816, 60 Cal. Rptr. 799, 803 (1967);
Murdock v. Gerth, 65 Cal. App. 2d 170, 180, 150 P.2d 489, 493 (1944).
115. 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1975).
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and honest belief that the client has a tenable claim.
Defendants in a malicious prosecution action are exonerated if
they acted reasonably on the basis of the facts which were actually
known to them at the time they instituted the suit."" Malice within
the context of a malicious prosecution action exists when the pro-
ceedings are instituted "primarily for an improper purpose.11 The
California Supreme Court recognizes four principal situations in
which an improper purpose may be presumed:
1. The plaintiff does not believe his claim may be held valid;
2. The proceedings are instituted primarily because of hostility
or ill will;
3. The proceedings are initiated solely for the purpose of de-
priving the defendant of the beneficial use of his property;
4. The proceedings are initiated for the purpose of forcing a
settlement which has no relation to the merits of the claims." 8
Plaintiffs in malicious prosecution actions encounter difficulties
in establishing actual malice. Many of the techniques they typically
attempt to use for this purpose are unlawful. For example, they may
attempt to show that a particular public interest group has repeat-
edly tried to stop other projects in the past. This type of evidence is
barred by case law" ' and Evidence Code section 1101(a). 20 Fur-
thermore, the plaintiff may not show malice by relying on statements
and actions which occur after the case is filed. 2 ' Often, plaintiffs in
malicious prosecution actions file declarations stating that they are
familiar with the improper tactics of the defendant and believe that
the prior action was motivated by ill will. This kind of statement is
also not cognizable by the court.'22
116. This is true even if the defendant could have ascertained the actual facts, had he
made more diligent inquiry. Jensen v. Leonard, 82 Cal. App. 2d 340, 352-53, 186 P.2d 206,
214 (1947). See also Richter v. Neilson, 11 Cal. App. 2d 503, 515, 54 P.2d 54, 59-60 (1936).
117. Albertson, 46 Cal. 2d at 383, 295 P.2d at 411.
118. Id.
119. See Larson v. Larsen which states: "It is a fundamental rule of evidence that you
cannot prove the commission of an act by showing the commission of similar acts by the same
person at other times and under other circumstances. Such evidence is simply not rele-
vant .. " 72 Cal. App. 169, 172, 236 P. 979, 981 (1925).
120. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1101(a) (West 1987).
121. Richter, 11 Cal. App. 2d at 515, 54 P.2d at 59-60.
122. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Manufacturers Bank, 104 Cal. App. 3d 70, 76, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 402, 406 (1980); C.L. Smith Co. v. Roger Ducharme, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 3d 735, 743,
135 Cal. Rptr. 483, 487 (1977); Mclver v. Savage, 220 Cal. App. 2d 128, 134, 33 Cal. Rptr.
740, 743 (1963).
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C. Abuse of Process
A second tort invoked in intimidation suits is abuse of process.
The essence of this tort is the use of legal process "to accomplish a
purpose for which it is not designed."12 Two elements must be es-
tablished: first, an ulterior purpose; and second, "a willful act in the
use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the
proceeding." 24
Carrying out the legal process to its authorized conclusion, even
with bad intentions, is not sufficient to establish a cause of action for
abuse of process. Instead, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the de-
fendant used the process as a form of coercion "to obtain a collateral
advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as
the surrender of property or the payment of money, by the use of the
process as a threat or a club. There is, in other words, a form of
extortion . .""' The court in Younger v. Solomon M reiterated
this idea, stating that "mere vexation or harassment are not recog-
nized as objectives sufficient to give rise to the tort.' ' 27
Plaintiffs in an abuse of process action must show that the col-
lateral advantage supposedly obtained by the defendant in the prior
suit was substantial. Twyford v. Twyford' 28 is illustrative. In that
divorce case, the wife filed a request for admission which suggested
that the husband forged her signature on a check. The court ruled
that no abuse of process existed since "any collateral advantage
gained from suggesting that husband forged a signature and cashed
the joint income tax refund check, if it exists at all, is de mini-
mus. . . . The possibility of a prosecution for forgery in a normal
marital case is virtually non existent.'
29
Thus, in the typical intimidation suit, the plaintiff is unable to
show that the public interest defendant sought a collateral advantage
in the prior suit. This is so because the interests the defendant at-
tempts to advance belong to the public at large; they are not for
personal gain. Furthermore, the objective of stopping a development
project is not collateral in a public interest lawsuit; it is the princi-
pal remedy sought.
123. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 231, 317 P.2d 613, 625-26 (1957).
124. Id. at 232, 317 P.2d at 626-27.
125. Id. at 232-33, 317 P.2d at 627.
126. 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1974).
127. Id. at 297, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
128. 63 Cal. App. 3d 916, 134 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1976).
129. Id. at 923-24, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
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D. Defamation
Another tort often asserted in intimidation suits is defamation.
The courts are reluctant to sustain a defamation cause of action in
the typical public interest case because of the danger of impinging on
the first amendment right of free speech. Thus, they distinguish be-
tween statements of fact, which may be libelous, and statements of
opinion, which enjoy absolute constitutional protection.3 0 The ques-
tion of whether an allegedly defamatory statement constitutes fact or
opinion is one of law. 3' Although the distinction may be difficult:
[W]here potentially defamatory statements are published in a
public debate, a heated labor dispute, or in another setting in
which the audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to per-
suade others to their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric
or hyperbole, language which generally might be considered as
statements of fact may well assume the character of statements
of opinion." 2
On this basis, the courts have determined that many harsh accu-
sations are not actionable. These include statements that a developer
entered into a corrupt relationship with a city councilman; 83 allega-
tions that a city councilman engaged in "chicanery and machina-
tions" and that his conduct was "recalcitrant" and merited "in-
130. As the California Supreme Court noted in Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.:
An essential element of libel ...is that the publication in question must con-
tain a false statement of fact. . . .This requirement ...is constitutionally
based. The reason for the rule, well stated by the high court, is that 'under the
First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges
and juries but on the competition of other ideas.'
17 Cal. 3d 596, 600-01, 552 P.2d 425, 427, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1976) (quoting from
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-44 (1974)).
131. Id. at 601. See also Okun v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 442, 450, 629 P.2d 1369,
1374, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157, 162, cert. denied sub nom., Maple Properties v. Superior Court,
454 U.S. 1099 (1981). However, if an allegedly libelous remark "could have been understood
by the average reader in either sense, the issue must be left to the jury's determination." Good
Gov't Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 682, 586 P.2d 572, 576,
150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 262 (1978). But even in this situation, the California Supreme Court
adopts a very strict test to meet the requirement of actual malice set forth in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The jury must also find that the ambiguous words:
[Wiere reasonably understood in their defamatory, factual sense, but also that
the defendant either deliberately cast his statements in an equivocal fashion in
the hope of insinuating a defamatory impact to the reader, or that he knew or
acted in reckless disregard of whether his words would be interpreted by the
average reader as defamatory statements of fact.
Good Gov't, 22 Cal. 3d at 684, 586 P.2d at 598, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
132. Gregory, 17 Cal. 3d at 601, 552 P.2d at 428, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
133. Okun, 29 Cal. 3d at 459, 629 P.2d at 1379, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
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famy;" 3 a charge that a county supervisor voted "to squander
property tax funds; ' " " and another that a city manager was suppos-
edly not "dedicated to efficiently and honestly administer the affairs
of the city.'"86
Two general guidelines on the fact/opinion dichotomy are help-
ful to public interest defendants. First, "statements occurring in the
course of a public debate are usually accorded the status of an opin-
ion. '"187 Second, "almost all, if not all, statements concerning the ef-
fect or application of an initiative can only be the opinion of the
interpreter, and the voting public is generally aware of this." 8 Pre-
sumably, the same guideline applies to the effect or application of
any statute, ordinance, or rule.
Another first amendment protection afforded to public interest
defamation defendants was noted by the California Supreme Court
in Okun v. Superior Court." 9 There, the court extended the "lee-
way for criticism of an individual who voluntarily injects himself or
herself into public controversy and so becomes a 'public figure' " to
include a developer who seeks a permit from a public body. 40
In Okun, the court sustained demurrers to all the causes of ac-
tion except the last, which alleged a conspiracy to commit slander. " "
On remand, the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to amend its cause
of action for conspiracy and slander. The court of appeals refused
leave to allow the plaintiff yet another attempt to state a good cause
of action, noting that expeditious resolution of cases is warranted
134. Good Gov't, 22 Cal. 3d at 678, 586 P.2d at 574, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
135. Sierra Breeze v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 102, 104, 149 Cal. Rptr. 914,
916 (1978).
136. Scott v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 Cal. App. 3d 277, 284, 112 Cal. Rptr. 609,
614 (1974).
137. Blackhawk Corp. v. Ewing, 94 Cal. App. 3d 640, 643, 156 Cal. Rptr. 581, 583
(1979).
138. Chavez v. Citizens for a Fair Farm Labor Law, 84 Cal. App. 3d 77, 82, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 278, 281 (1978).
139. 29 Cal. 3d 442, 451, 629 P.2d 1369, 1374, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157, 162 (1981).
140. Id. See also Greenbelt Co-Op Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 8-9 (1970).
141. 29 Cal. 3d at 460, 629 P.2d at 1380, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 168. Justice Mosk wrote a
spirited partial dissent from this ruling on behalf of three justices, arguing that the case should
not be further prolonged:
ITIhere comes a time when the finality of litigation is almost as important as the
decision therein. In the preservation of the free exercise of speech, writing and
the political function, the early termination of this lawsuit is highly desirable.
We should discourage attempts to recover through the judicial process what has
been lost in the political process.
Id. at 461, 629 P.2d at 1381, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
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when first amendment rights are in danger of being chilled.14
E. Conspiracy
Plaintiffs in intimidation suits usually include a cause of action
for civil conspiracy. It is not a serious problem because its only sig-
nificance is to make all defendants joint tortfeasors.143 A cause of
action for civil conspiracy does not survive if there are no other via-
ble causes of action based on other torts."4' It should also be noted
that an allegation of civil conspiracy does not defeat the privilege of
Civil Code section 47(2).""'
VIII. REMEDIES FOR INTIMIDATION DEFENDANTS ARE
INADEQUATE
As discussed in the previous section, although the defendant in
an intimidation suit is almost certain to prevail, the cost is apt to be
high. Unfortunately, under the present state of the law, there is little
to deter developers from bringing such suits. A brief review of the
possible counter-measures now available to public interest groups il-
lustrates this difficult situation.
A. Counter-suit for Malicious Prosecution
At first glance it appears that public interest litigants, after tri-
umphing in an intimidation suit, could then sue developers for mali-
cious prosecution. There are, however, serious practical and legal ob-
stacles connected with this course of action. The most blatant
problem is that it means yet another round of litigation, with its
attendant anxieties. The potential public-interest litigant must pro-
vide resources to pay an attorney to bring such a suit or to find one
willing to take on a lengthy, bitter fight on a contingency basis. Few
lawyers are eager to accept such a challenge in view of the extreme
difficulty involved in winning a malicious prosecution case.
It is true that the first amendment constitutional defense is not
available to the developer, since filing an intimidation suit does not
constitute petitioning a government agency. It is also true that the
developer might find it hard to establish probable cause based on
142. Maple Properties v. Harris, 158 Cal. App. 3d 997, 1013, 205 Cal. Rptr. 532, 543(1984), cert. denied sub nom., Normington Levy and Normington v. Court of Appeal, 470
U.S. 1054 (1985). The court also awarded sanctions for a frivolous appeal. Id. at 1005-12.
143. See 4 WITKIN SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS § 31 (8th ed. 1973).
144. Okun, 29 Cal. 3d at 454, 629 P.2d at 1376, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
145. Pettitt, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 489-90, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
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advice of counsel since the defendant in a malicious prosecution ac-
tion always has the burden of proving this defense. 1" The developer
may also have difficulty satisfying the requirement that "advice of
counsel must be sought in good faith and not as a mere cloak to
protect one against a suit for malicious prosecution or to refute the
theory of malice.' 1 4 7 Furthermore, in order to establish such a de-
fense, the developer would have to waive the attorney-client privi-
lege, thus subjecting his good faith to close scrutiny.' 8
Additionally, it is possible to assert a cause of action against the
developer's attorney, as well as his client. To succeed, the plaintiff
must show that "a prudent attorney, after such investigation of the
facts and research of the law as the circumstances reasonably war-
rant, would have considered the action to be tenable on the theory
advanced."'" 9 But when all factors are considered, malicious prose-
cution suits are very hard to win and the trauma of having to go
through yet another lawsuit is likely to dishearten all but the most
fervent seekers of justice.
B. Attorneys Fees
One potentially powerful means of securing recompense to the
public interest defendant in an intimidation suit is to require the
losing plaintiff to pay his opponent's attorneys fees. Under the tradi-
tional American rule, the prevailing party in litigation is not entitled
to collect his attorneys fees from the loser.' Gradually, in conjunc-
tion with the rise of public interest litigation, the courts carved out
an exception for cases in which the plaintiff served the common good
by acting as a private attorney general.' 5 ' The California Supreme
Court explained that the doctrine:
146. Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 54, 529 P.2d 608, 616, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 184, 192 (1974).
147. Walker v. Jensen, 95 Cal. App. 2d 269, 274, 212 P.2d 569, 572 (1949).
148. Id. See also Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d
1047, 1053, 233 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828-29 (1987); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413
F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Schubkegel v. Gordino, 56 Cal. App. 2d 667, 672-73,
133 P.2d 475, 479 (1943); Jackson v. Beckham, 217 Cal. App. 2d 264, 272, 31 Cal. Rptr. 739,
744 (1963).
149. Williams v. Coombs, 179 Cal. App. 3d 626, 637, 224 Cal. Rptr. 865, 874 (1986).
The attorney is obligated to make an independent investigation of the facts and may not rely
solely on his client's word. Id. at 640-41. See also Kaiman v. Myers, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1251,
1260, 234 Cal. Rptr. 758, 766 (1987).
150. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
151. Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977) (Ser-
rano III); Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 593 P.2d 200, 154
Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979).
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[Riests upon the recognition that privately initiated lawsuits are
often essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public pol-
icies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions and that,
without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorneys
fees, private actions to enforce such important policies will as a
practical matter frequently be infeasible. 52
The federal system rejects the common-law basis for fee awards;
fees are granted only when they are specifically authorized by stat-
ute. 15 3 The Supreme Court notes that at least seventeen such federal
statutes exist.154 In California, the "private attorney general" theory
is now codified in Civil Procedure Code section 1021.5,155 although
the common-law power of courts to award attorneys fees still exists.
The moving party's eligibility for an award under section
1021.5 is determined by three factors: (1) whether important rights
are vindicated; (2) whether the general public or a large class of
persons benefited; and (3) whether the necessity and financial burden
of private enforcement make an award appropriate. 1 5 Defendants in
an intimidation suit may meet the requirements of the statute with
respect to the first two showings, since the courts allow fee awards
against private parties, as well as governmental entities, when the
claimant vindicates important public policies.157 Furthermore, under
certain circumstances, fees are awarded to defendants, as well as
plaintiffs."
The third prong of this test, however, presents a formidable ob-
stacle. The party seeking fees must show that "the cost of the claim-
ant's legal victory transcends his personal interest. . . ." and his
burden is "out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.' 5
A defendant in an intimidation suit would encounter difficulties in
152. Woodland, 23 Cal. 3d at 933, 593 P.2d at 208, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
153. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 262.
154. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682 n.1 (1983).
155. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1986); see also Folsom v. Butte County
Ass'n of Gov'ts, 32 Cal. 3d 668, 682, 652 P.2d 437, 447, 186 Cal. Rptr. 589, 599 (1982).
156. One additional statutory requirement, that "such fees should not in the interest ofjustice be paid out of the recovery, if any," is largely inapplicable to public interest litigation,
in which the plaintiff usually seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, rather than money dam-
ages. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1986).
157. See, e.g., Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 34 Cal. 3d 311, 318, 667 P.2d 704, 707, 193
Cal. Rptr. 900, 903 (1983); Franzblau v. Monardo, 108 Cal. App. 3d 522, 530, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 610, 614 (1980); Braude v. Automobile Club of Southern California, 178 Cal. App. 3d
994, 1011, 223 Cal. Rptr. 914, 924 (1986).
158. San Luis Obispo County v. Abalone Alliance, 178 Cal. App. 3d 848, 870, 223 Cal.
Rptr. 846, 858 (1986) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 167-72).
159. Inyo County v. City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 89, 144 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76
(1978).
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meeting this requirement. Rather, the plaintiff could argue that the
defendant, faced with the possibility of a large adverse judgment,
would be litigating to serve "pressing needs of his own" and "[a]ny
public value derived from the result obtained was . . . wholly coinci-
dental to the attainment of [his] personal goals."' 60
Two environmental cases illustrate the general problem sur-
rounding the third part of the statutory test. In Schwartz v. City of
Rosemead"6 plaintiff succeeded in halting the construction of a large
co-generation plant next to his property because of a failure to com-
ply with CEQA. He then sought attorneys fees under Civil Proce-
dure Code section 1021.5. The court denied the application for two
reasons. First, the plaintiff also filed a cause of action for private
nuisance, thus demonstrating that his primary motive was to protect
his own land, rather than the public interest. 6" Second, the plaintiff
sought $22,000 in fees, but previously stated that construction of the
plant would diminish his property's value by $100,000. Thus, his
attorneys fees clearly did not "transcend his personal interests."' 63
In Beach Colony II v. California Coastal Commission"" the
plaintiff, a partnership formed to develop a beachfront tract, success-
fully challenged a ruling by the California Coastal Commission. The
Commission determined that the partnership would have to transfer
a portion of its property to the public in exchange for a permit to
restore the land to its original contours, after avulsive wave action
swept away a portion of the tract. The court noted that the plain-
tiff's victory saved it $300,000 in off-site improvement costs. Thus,
the court observed, "[t]he public benefit from the lawsuit was wholly
coincidental to Colony II's profit-making goals.' 6 5 The plaintiffs'
strong economic interest in the suit violated the policy of section
1021.5.166
Of course, these cases did not deal with fees for defendants,
who are not trying to gain from litigation. The only decision apply-
ing Civil Procedure Code section 1021.5 to a claim for fees by de-
fendants so far is San Luis Obispo County v. Abalone Alliance.
67
In this case, members of several environmental groups attempted to
160. Marini v. Municipal Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 829, 837, 160 Cal. Rptr. 465, 470
(1979).
161. 155 Cal. App. 3d 547, 202 Cal. Rptr. 400 (1984).
162. Id. at 559, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
163. Id. at 560, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
164. 166 Cal. App. 3d 106, 212 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1985).
165. Id. at 114, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
166. Id. at 115, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
167. 178 Cal. App. 3d 848, 223 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1986).
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halt construction of the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant by
blocking access roads to workers. Several pro-nuclear groups sued
the environmental organizations and three of their members, alleging
that the increased costs to the utility occasioned by the blockade
would be passed on to them in the form of higher rates. The county
of San Luis Obispo sued to collect police costs incurred during the
blockade. The court of appeals quickly disposed of the case on the
merits, noting that public agencies may not sue for police costs.16
The court also stated that the plaintiffs improperly sought to recover
for damages to a third party-the utility-and, in any event, lacked
standing.16'
The defendants then moved for fees under section 1021.5. The
court held that the statute did not preclude an award of fees to de-
fendants if the necessary showings were demonstrated.17 0 It upheld
as reasonable the trial court's finding that the defendants conferred a
significant benefit on a large class of people by helping to preserve
the fundamental right to protest.17 1
The key question was whether the defendants satisfied the fi-
nancial burden requirement. The court found that they did:
Similarly, the motivation for defending this lawsuit cannot rea-
sonably be attributed exclusively to a desire by defendants to
protect their own pocketbooks. This is not a garden variety
damage suit. Just a few weeks after filing suit, plaintiffs moved
for a preliminary injunction to prevent defendant Abalone Alli-
ance from planning or conducting any future blockades of
Diablo Canyon. If respondents had been interested solely in
avoiding pecuniary loss, they could readily have agreed to an
injunction. Instead, by vigorously resisting appellants' motion,
they indicated their goals were not merely financial.
The file shows that defendants are anti-nuclear and envi-
ronmental activists concerned with a political goal-'the termi-
nation of the Diablo Canyon facility as a nuclear power plant.'
Since defendants' goal in litigating this suit transcends personal
self-interests, the 'financial burden' criterion is met.'1 2
Is the Abalone Alliance decision a useful precedent for other
intimidation suits? Possibly, but the unique circumstances present in
that case may serve to distinguish it from most other situations,
168. Id. at 858-59, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
169. Id. at 862-64, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 853-54.
170. Id. at 869, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
171. Id. at 867, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
172. Id. at 868-69, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58.
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which are not so highly politicized. In the meantime, under the pre-
sent state of the law, it is unwise for intimidation defendants to rely
too heavily on extracting their fees from plaintiffs.
C. Sanctions
Both federal and state law authorize sanctions against parties
and their attorneys for abusive tactics. California's Civil Procedure
Code section 128.5(a)" permits a court to award expenses, includ-
ing attorneys fees, for actions which are frivolous 17 1 or intended
solely to cause unnecessary delay. Civil Procedure Code section
907175 provides an analogous remedy for frivolous appeals. Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11176 gives a judge similar powers to
award sanctions against attorneys.
The California Supreme Court construes the sanctions power
strictly. In In re Marriage of Flaherty17 the court indicated that
sanctions are proper only when a case or appeal "is prosecuted for
an improper motive-to harass the respondent or delay the effect of
an adverse judgment- or when it indisputably has no merit-when
any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and
completely without merit."'M8  Despite the existence of this strict
standard, the California courts awarded sanctions in a number of
situations.'1 9
One recent case shows how sanctions are effectively used in the
context of a retaliation suit. In Vaccaro v. Stephens,'8" plaintiff was
173. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 128.5(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
174. Defined as "totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harass-
ing an opposing party." Id.
175. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 907 (West 1980).
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
177. 31 Cal. 3d 637, 646 P.2d 179, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1982).
178. Id. at 650, 646 P.2d at 187, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
179. See, e.g., Maple Properties v. Harris, 158 Cal. App. 3d 997, 205 Cal. Rptr. 532
(1984) (sanctions against attorneys who filed a second appeal on issues which had previously
been considered and rejected in an earlier appeal); M.E. Gray Co. v. Gray, 163 Cal. App. 3d
1025, 210 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1985) (sanctions against law firm which filed a motion to dismiss
for failure to prosecute after court had granted its motion to continue the trial; additional
sanctions awarded for frivolous appeal); Karwasky v. Zachay, 146 Cal. App. 3d 679, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 292 (1983) (sanctions against law firm for bringing motion without presenting any evi-
dence or authorities); Hummel v. First Nat'l Bank, 191 Cal. App. 3d 489, 236 Cal. Rptr. 449
(1987) (sanctions against party and law firm for filing an appeal which re-hashed issues raised
on prior appeal, attempted to seek review of a non-appealable order, included a voluminous,
irrelevant record, and ignored the existence of the only evidence in the record on the subject,
which disproved appellant's case).
180. Award of Rule 11 Attorney's Fees on Defendant's Second Counterclaim, Vaccaro
v. Stephens (No. 86-0184 N.D. Cal.) (Jan. 28, 1984) (On file at the Santa Clara Law Review
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a passenger on a transcontinental airline flight. She attempted to use
the bathroom in the first class section when defendant, a first class
passenger, yelled at her, shoved her away from the bathroom, and
used the facilities before her. Plaintiff later sued for assault and bat-
tery, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
negligence.
The defendant counter-sued for wrongful arrest and added a
counter-claim for trespass. Before trial, the court granted plaintiff's
motion to dismiss the trespass claim, ruling that the counter-claim
was frivolous because it was not made in good faith or based on
existing law. The court awarded sanctions of almost $5,000 against
defendant's lawyers.18'
Thus, the availability of sanctions offers some possibility of de-
terrence for the most ludicrous intimidation suits. However, the strict
requirements imposed by the courts before sanctions are granted
mean that they are rarely available. Furthermore, the typical sanc-
tion award is a relatively minimal amount and is usually imposed
against an attorney, rather than his client. Thus, a determined devel-
oper is not likely to be discouraged from filing a retaliation suit by
the remote possibility of sanctions. A more effective remedy is
required.
IX. Two SUGGESTED CHANGES TO DISCOURAGE INTIMIDATION
SUITS
As previously discussed, defendants in intimidation suits possess
no truly effective means to retaliate against developer-plaintiffs who
attempt to punish them or frighten them away from further public-
spirited activity. Under the present state of the law, such a defendant
is forced to pay his or her own attorney and, for all practical pur-
poses, does not have a viable means of seeking retribution. This
problem could be remedied if the current law were changed to ac-
commodate the victims of intimidation suits. Two such changes
might prove useful.
A. Permit Immediate Cross-claim for Malicious Prosecution
A counter-suit for malicious prosecution is not an attractive
remedy, since it requires the institution and maintenance of a new
round of litigation. This is so because in Babb v. Superior Court, 8
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the California Supreme Court ruled that a defendant cannot prose-
cute a cross-complaint or counter-claim for malicious prosecution
until the first or main action is terminated. In Babb, the doctor-de-
fendant in a medical malpractice suit sought to file a cross-com-
plaint. The declaration stated that if he should prevail, the case was
instituted and prosecuted maliciously and thus, he should be
awarded costs and fees.
The court cited three reasons why the cross-complaint for mali-
cious prosecution was disallowed. First, there was the "metaphysical
difficulty" that the cause of action does not exist until the previous
suit is terminated. "Were we to entertain a cross-action for malicious
prosecution, we would create the incongruous situation of such an
action being filed long before the statute of limitations begins to
run."188
Second, the court found that considerations of "practical judicial
administration" worked against the cross-claim. There might be in-
consistent judgments, since the declaratory relief causes of action are
tried by a judge, while the jury decides the malpractice suit. Further-
more, requiring termination of the underlying suit could eliminate
unnecessary litigation, since the defendant would not file a malicious
prosecution suit if he lost the main case. Also, the favorable termina-
tion requirement facilitates a speedy and orderly trial, because the
other elements of malicious prosecution (malice and lack of probable
cause) "are substantially easier to determine with the record of the
underlying action available as evidence."' 8
Finally, the court cited strong policy considerations which dic-
tated against allowing a cross-complaint for malicious prosecution. It
noted that the law disfavors this type of action. Furthermore, evi-
dence on the issues of malice and probable cause might prejudice the
trier of fact against the plaintiff's underlying complaint. In addition,
the attorney for the plaintiff might be joined as a cross-defendant in
the malicious prosecution action, which could place him in a position
adverse to his client and might also necessitate the client's hiring sep-
arate counsel to pursue the original claim.
Much of this reasoning is inapplicable or is overcome by other
policy considerations in an intimidation suit. First, the "metaphysical
difficulty" of allowing a cause of action for malicious prosecution
before the statute of limitations begins to run is not so acute in the
public interest field. Typically, environmental and other public inter-
183. Id. at 846, 479 P.2d at 381-82, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82.
184. Id. at 847, 479 P.2d at 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
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est cases are cast in the form of actions for injunction to prevent
unlawful activity before it has even commenced. And, of course, the
purpose of a statute of limitations is to provide repose, and to pre-
vent the assertion of stale claims. 8" Those objectives are served by
allowing malicious prosecution cases to be decided at the same time
as the underlying case. The cross-defendant would know immedi-
ately that he was subject to suit; the evidence would be as fresh as
possible, since it would be gathered in the course of a single lawsuit.
Thus, the incongruity of allowing a cross-action for malicious prose-
cution is not really so great. In any event, bifurcating the trial, with
the cross-claim tried only after the successful conclusion of the pri-
mary case, eliminates the statute of limitations objection, since the
statute begins to run as soon as the plaintiff loses.
Second, the problems of "practical judicial administration" cited
by the Babb opinion do not pose an insuperable barrier. The danger
of inconsistent judgments is eliminated if the underlying claim and
the cross-claim are decided before the same trier of fact.' 86 Further-
more, a convincing argument exists that dealing with the malicious
prosecution claim as a cross-complaint actually reduces the amount
of litigation necessary, since only one case, rather than two, would
need to be filed. This, in turn, means that discovery, preliminary
motions, etc. take place only once, rather than in two different pieces
of litigation. Also, bifurcating the trial, as suggested above, allows
the judge to prevent the jury from hearing any potentially prejudicial
evidence until the main case is concluded.
Finally, the strong policy considerations which govern the nor-
mal case simply do not apply to a cross-complaint for malicious
prosecution in an intimidation suit. In that situation, public policy
weighs in favor of encouraging the activities of the defendant, while
discouraging the intimidation plaintiff.
In short, the traditional reasons assigned to the courts' refusal to
countenance a cross-complaint for malicious prosecution are inappli-
cable to intimidation suits. Therefore, such cross-complaints should
be permitted where the plaintiff complains about public-interest ac-
tivities of the defendant. A court could determine whether the de-
fendant, in fact, acted in the public interest by applying a test based
on the factors set forth in California's Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1021.5,187 described above. That is, if the defendant: (1) was
185. 3 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions, § 309 (3d ed. 1985).
186. Indeed, in Babb v. Superior Court, the court concedes this point. 3 Cal. 3d 841,
847 n.3, 479 P.2d 379, 382 n.3, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 182 n.3 (1971).
187. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1021.5 (West 1980)
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trying to effectuate an important right affecting the public interest
which; (2) would confer a significant benefit on the general public or
a large class of persons; and if (3) the necessity and financial burden
of private enforcement were such that the public-interest party
would be entitled to fees if he prevailed, then the public-interest de-
fendant would be allowed to file a cross-claim for malicious
prosecution.
B. Authorize Attorneys Fees Under Civil Procedure Code Section
1021.5
As noted above, fees are typically awarded under section 1021.5
only to plaintiffs, with the Abalone Alliance case standing as the one
exception."'R Judges are unaccustomed to the concept of granting
fees to defendants who perform a public service. Accordingly, the
statute should be amended so as to provide specific authorization to
allow courts to award fees to public interest defendants.
In addition, in determining whether private enforcement is nec-
essary and financially burdensome, thus compelling a financial re-
ward, courts should discount the potential economic loss to defend-
ants as a reason to deny fees. Instead, they should focus on whether
the defendant sought to advance the public's, rather than his own
private interest, in the underlying action. If so, and if the defendant's
prior activities met the other criteria of section 1021.5, then defend-
ants should be entitled to fees if they prevail in an intimidation suit.
X. CONCLUSION
Intimidation suits are a classic example of an abuse of the judi-
cial system. By means of unjustified litigation, resource-users seek to
squelch the guardians of the public interest, who already operate at
a huge disadvantage due to the harsh economic and political realities
of our system. The present system does nothing to discourage this
tactic. Win or lose, the plaintiff in an intimidation suit achieves his
objective. If society wishes to continue to reap the benefits of the
watchdog activities of public-interest groups, it must provide them
with protection against unwarranted litigation.
The reforms advocated in this article would cause potential
users of intimidation tactics to hesitate before employing them. If
they knew that the same trier of fact that rejected their activities
could express its disapproval by means of a large judgment on a
188. 178 Cal. App. 3d 848, 223 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1986).
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counter-claim, they might reconsider their choice to institute litiga-
tion. Furthermore, if they also risked paying the defendants' legal
fees as well as their own, an additional note of caution will be added.
The public will be well served by the imposition of these restraints.

